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AN ARBITRARY STANDARD FOR RECOVERY IN
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS CLAIMS
Sinn v. Burd
404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979)
While it is fundamental to the American common law system that
one may seek redress for every substantial wrong,' even the law must
recognize that not every human loss arising out of another's conduct
constitutes a legal injury for which compensation shall be available.
2
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 3 in Sinn v. Burd4 was faced with
the difficult task of deciding if a mother who suffered mental distress as
a result of witnessing her young daughter being struck and killed by a
negligently driven automobile had suffered a compensable injury. The
court in Sinn held that although the plaintiff herself was not within any
zone of personal physical danger and had no reason to fear for her own
safety, she had pleaded sufficient facts upon which to be granted relief.5
Thus, under Pennsylvania law, a mother's mental distress suffered as a
result of viewing her young daughter's accidental death is a compensa-
ble injury.
6
This comment will first explain how the Sinn decision attempts to
set a logical standard for recovery in a negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim. It will next discuss why the Sinn court's decision unfor-
tunately has resulted in an arbitrary standard for recovery. Also, this
comment will address the issue of whether the Sinn court's holding has
circumvented the legislative intent of the Pennsylvania wrongful death
statute. Finally, it will examine whether the Sinn court fully consid-
ered the public policy issue of unduly burdensome liability on insured
motorists. Before this analysis can be undertaken, an understanding of
the divergent views of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
is helpful.
1. Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 403, 261 A.2d 84, 85 (1970).
2. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § I at 2-4 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as
PROSSER].
3. Justice Nix delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justice Larsen and Justice
Manderino joined. Chief Justice Eagen filed a concurring opinion. Justice Roberts filed a dissent-
ing opinion in which Justice O'Brien joined.
4. 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979).
5. Id. at 686.
6. Id
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THE THREE TESTS FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has been a
source of confusion and much litigation in courts throughout the
United States.7 This confusion is exemplified by the various tests that
courts have applied in determining whether or not such a cause of ac-
tion for negligent infliction of emotional distress can be maintained.
The courts have developed three separate tests for making this determi-
nation: the "impact rule," the "zone of danger" test, and the "pure
negligence" test.8
Under the "impact rule," a cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress cannot be maintained in the absence of contem-
poraneous physical impact.9 Typically, courts have interpreted this
rule to mean that damages could be recovered only if a physical injury
caused the emotional distress. '0 Most courts have recognized the inher-
ent harshness of the "impact rule;" thus, it is currently in use in only a
minority of jurisdictions."
As an alternative to the "impact rule," the majority of courts have
adopted the "zone of danger" test.' 2  This test required that the
tortfeasor create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to a person
before that person can recover.' 3 Although the "zone of danger" test
does not require actual physical impact, it does require that the plaintiff
be within the area of potential physical harm. Moreover, a plaintiff
within the zone of danger must demonstrate that the emotional distress
caused a physical injury.' 4
7. See Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612 (1916) (denying recovery in the absence
of physical harm resulting from the negligently inflicted emotional distress); Leong v. Takasaki, 55
Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (allowing recovery absent the showing of any physical injury);
Benza v. Shulman Air Freight, 46 I11. App. 3d 521, 361 N.E.2d 91 (1977) (where the plaintiff was
denied recovery when the defendant's negligent driving caused the plaintiff severe emotional dis-
tress); see also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100 (1959).
8. See Comment, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1089.
9. See, e.g., Kaiserman v. Bright, 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71, 377 N.E.2d 261, 264 (1978); Ken-
tucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 23 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Ky. 1929).
10. See, e.g., Braun v. Craven, 175 111. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. L.
Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 290, 30 N.W. 888 (1886); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E.
354 (1896). See text accompanying note 23 infra for rationale of the "impact rule."
11. See Note, Negligent Infliction afMental Distress, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1248, 1251 (1974).
12. Id
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965). See also Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F.
Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1965); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933). See text accom-
panying notes 29-31 infra for rationale of the "zone of danger" test.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) states: "If the actor's conduct is negli-
gent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to
another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compen-
sable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Some courts have gone beyond the "zone of danger" test and per-
mitted recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress using a
"pure negligence" test.' 5 This test merely requires that, to recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff foreseeably suffer
emotional distress as a result of the defendant's negligence.' 6 Further-
more, most courts adopting the "pure negligence" test have retained
the requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a physical manifestation
of the emotional distress to recover.' 7 Only two courts have held that a
showing of emotional distress alone is sufficient to recover damages.' 8
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN PENNSYLVANIA
As recently as 1966, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed its
adherence to the "impact rule" in Knaub v. Gotwalt.19 In Knaub, par-
ents had witnessed the death of their son when he was struck by a neg-
ligently driven automobile. The deceased's sister was within three feet
of the boy when he was killed.20 The entire family sued to recover for
the extreme mental shock and anguish they had suffered.21 The court
held that the plaintiffs' complaint was defective as it failed to allege
that there had been physical impact upon the plaintiffs by the negli-
gently driven automobile. 22 The court reasoned that to allow the plain-
tiffs to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress without
physical impact would cause a flood of similar litigation. Furthermore,
the court stated that medical science would be unable to distinguish a
15. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968); Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524
(1975).
16. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
17. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968); D'Ambra
v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975).
18. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). The plaintiff, a ten year old boy,
suffered severe emotional distress while observing his stepgrandmother being struck and killed by
a negligently driven automobile. The plaintiff did not manifest any physical injury as a result of
the emotional distress. The court rejected the physical injury requirement stating that it was "an-
other of the artificial devices to guarantee the genuineness of a claim which may actually foreclose
relief to a genuine claim." Id. at 403, 520 P.2d at 762-63. Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979),
also rejected the physical injury requirement.
19. 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966). See Besley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263
(1958); Geffer v. Rosenthal, 384 Pa. 123, 119 A.2d 250 (1956); Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380
Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955); Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948);
Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 322 Pa. 333, 185 A. 744 (1936); Howarth v. Adams Express Co.,
269 Pa. 280, 112 A. 536 (1921); Morris v. Lackawanna & Wyo. Valley R.R., 228 Pa. 198, 77 A. 445
(1910); Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905); Ewing v. Pittsburgh,
C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892); Fox v. Borkey, 126 Pa. 164, 17 A. 604 (1889).
20. 422 Pa. at 270, 220 A.2d at 646.
21. Id
22. Id at 270-71, 220 A.2d at 647-48.
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genuine claim from a fraudulent claim.23
In 1970, in Niederman v. Brodsky,24 the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania abandoned the "impact rule" and adopted the "zone of dan-
ger" test.25 In Niederman, the plaintiff suffered an acute heart attack
when a negligently driven automobile narrowly missed striking him
when it skidded onto the sidewalk and struck his son.26 When the
plaintiff sued, the trial court, relying on Knaub,27 dismissed the case as
the plaintiff had not been the victim of any physical impact. 28 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower court and
held that if the plaintiff was in personal danger of physical impact and
actually feared such impact, then he could recover for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress.29 The court went on to reject the notion that
medical science was unable to distinguish genuine claims from fraudu-
lent claims without a physical impact.30 However, the court retained
the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate a physical manifestation of
the emotional distress to assure that no frauds would go undetected.
Thus, in Niederman, Pennsylvania abandoned the "impact rule" and
adopted the "zone of danger" test. Nine years later, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania again faced a claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress in Sinn v. Burd.
31
SINN v BURD
Facts of the Case
On June 12, 1975, Mrs. Sinn's daughters, Lisa and Deborah, were
standing by Mrs. Sinn's mailbox when an automobile operated by the
defendant struck Lisa and hurled her through the air.32 The resultant
injuries caused Lisa's death. Deborah was not struck by the vehicle
although it narrowly missed her. Mrs. Sinn 33 witnessed the accident
from a position near the front door of her home. The plaintiff filed a
four count trespass complaint against the defendant on June 3, 1976.
23. Id at 271, 220 A.2d at 647.
24. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
25. Id at 413, 261 A.2d at 90.
26. Id at 402-03, 261 A.2d at 84.
27. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
28. 436 Pa. at 403, 261 A.2d at 85.
29. Id at 413, 261 A.2d at 90.
30. Id at 404-05, 261 A.2d at 87.
31. 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979).
32. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Id.
at 673. On review, therefore, the well pleaded allegations of fact are to be taken as true. Byers v.
Ward, 368 Pa. 416, 84 A.2d 307 (1951).
33. Hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The first and second counts were brought under the Wrongful Death
and Survival Act.34 The third count was brought on behalf of Deborah
for the psychological damages she sustained as a result of watching her
sister's death. The fourth count was brought by the plaintiff for dam-
ages she sustained from the emotional stress of witnessing her daugh-
ter's death.
The defendant filed preliminary objections in the nature of a de-
murrer35 to the third and fourth counts of the complaint. The demurrer
asserted that the complaint failed to aver that Deborah and the plaintiff
were in personal danger of physical impact.
The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas' Civil Division,
36
sitting en banc, overruled the demurrer as to the third count but sus-
tained it as to the fourth count.37 The trial court ruled that since
Deborah was within the zone of danger, she could proceed with her
action. However, the trial court held that since the mother was outside
the zone of danger her cause of action must be dismissed.38 The plain-
tiff appealed to the Superior Court which affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion without issuing an opinion.39 When the plaintiff appealed to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that court reversed the trial court's
holding and stated that the plaintiff had pleaded facts upon which relief
could be granted.
Reasoning of the Court
The court in Sinn recognized five policy arguments relevant to by-
stander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. They
are: medical science's potential difficulty in proving causation between
the claimed damages and the alleged fright; the fear of fraudulent
or exaggerated claims; the concern that to allow such recovery will pre-
cipitate a veritable flood of litigation; the problem of unlimited and
unduly burdensome liability; and the difficulty of reasonably circum-
scribing the area of liability.
40
The Sinn court first addressed the issue of whether medical science
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8301 (Purdon 1978).
35. The demurrer was filed pursuant to 231 Pa. Code § 1017(b)(4) (1979). A demurrer is a
response that the complaint failed to aver facts sufficient to constitute a valid cause of action, thus
relieving the defendant from any obligation to file an answer. See Purry v. First Nat'l Bank, 270
Pa. 556, 113 A. 847 (1921).
36. Hereinafter referred to as the trial court.
37. See 404 A.2d at 675.
38. Id
39. Sinn v. Burd, 253 Pa. Super. 627, 384 A.2d 1003 (1978).
40. 404 A.2d at 678.
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is able to supply a causal link between the psychic damage suffered by
the bystander and the shock or fright attendant to having witnessed the
accident.4 1 The court noted that Pennsylvania courts had long assumed
that medical science was unable to establish that the alleged psychic
injuries were both real and, in fact, had resulted from seeing a grue-
some accident.42 Recognition of advancements in modem science led
the Sinn court to conclude that psychic injuries are capable of being
proven despite the absence of a physical manifestation of such an in-
jury.43 Therefore, the court abolished the rule that there be a physical
manifestation of the emotional distress before recovery is allowed in
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
The court also rejected the notion that bystander recovery will
open the door to fictitious injuries and fraudulent claims. Relying on
Niederman,44 the court stated that modem science has advanced to the
point where factual, legal, and medical charlatans are likely to be un-
masked at trial.45 Moreover, the court felt that public policy requires
that the legal and medical professions work together to prevent fraudu-
lent claims.46 Thus, fear of fraudulent claims was held to be an insuffi-
cient reason to deny bystander recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether the fear of a flood of
litigation is a sufficient reason to deny bystander recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. The court agreed with the late Dean
Prosser when he stated:
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at
the expense of a flood of litigation; and it is a pitiful confession of
incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon
the ground that it will give the courts too much work to do.47
Thus, the court was willing to increase its workload rather than let
what it felt was a substantial wrong go without a legal remedy.
The Sinn court also dealt with the concern that bystander recovery
would present a problem of unlimited or unduly burdensome liability.
The court agreed that this decision was an extension of liability, but
41. Id
42. Id See, e.g., Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905)
(describing a cause of action for mental disturbance as being intangible, untrustworthy, illusory,
and speculative).
43. 404 A.2d at 679.
44. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
45. 404 A.2d at 680.
46. Id
47. Id. at 681, citing Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering.- A New Tort, 37 MICH.
L. REV. 874, 877 (1939).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
held that it was not unduly burdensome. The court reasoned that the
more complex and interwoven societal relations become, the greater
the responsibility one must accept for his or her conduct. 48 Further-
more, the conduct in the instant case, the negligent operation of a vehi-
cle, has traditionally been held to be actionable by plaintiffs who have
sustained provable damages.
49
Another concern of the court in allowing recovery was the effect
on constantly advancing insurance costs. 50 The Sinn court agreed with
the dissent in the leading New York case, Tobin v. Grossman,5' where
the majority denied bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. The Tobin dissent pointed out that there was no evi-
dence that allowing bystander recovery would have dire effects on
insurance costs.
52
The court in Sinn agreed that some limits on liability were neces-
sary. To this end, the court held that a defendant will not be liable for
the mental distress that may be experienced by the most timid or sensi-
tive members of society.5 3 Thus, the court directed the trial courts to
focus upon the situation producing the emotional distress and to re-
quire that the occurrence be of such a nature that it would be likely to
produce severe emotional distress in a person of average sensitivities.
54
The Sinn court concluded that with this limitation, concerns over un-
limited and unduly burdensome liability were not sufficient to deny
bystander recovery.
The Sinn court was then faced with the difficult task of reasonably
circumscribing the area of liability. The court expressed confidence
that the application of the traditional tort concept of foreseeability
would reasonably limit the tortfeasor's liability. 55 The court, in defin-
ing what is reasonably foreseeable, looked to three factors expressed in
Dillon v. Legg56 which was the first case to allow bystander recovery
48. 404 A.2d at 681.
49. Id at 683.
50. Id at 684.
51. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969). In Tobin, the plaintiff heard
the screech of automobile brakes and immediately went to the scene of the accident. There she
saw her two year old child seriously injured and lying helplessly on the ground. She brought suit
for the severe emotional distress she suffered. The court dismissed her complaint holding that the
plantiff had not pleaded facts upon which relief could be granted. The court reasoned that if it
allowed recovery here, the court would be creating a new tort which would result in unduly bur-
densome liability.
52. 24 N.Y.2d at 619, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 562, 249 N.E.2d at 425 (Keating, J., dissenting).
53. 404 A.2d at 683.
54. Id
55. Id at 684.
56. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
1017
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for negligent infliction of emotional distress.5 7
In Dillon, a mother brought an action to recover damages for the
mental distress she suffered when she witnessed the accident in which
her infant daughter was struck and killed by a negligently driven auto-
mobile.5 8 While the Dillon court allowed the mother to recover, it lim-
ited the scope of liability by setting out three factors as general
determinants of liability. These factors were:
Whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
contrasted with one who was a distance away.
Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after
its occurrence.
Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship. 9
The court in Sinn, in adopting these three factors, agreed that they
would reasonably circumscribe the area of liability.60 Mrs. Sinn met all
three elements of this test because she was located near the accident,
witnessed it happen, and was the victim's mother. Thus, the Penn-
sylvania high court held that her mental distress was foreseeable as a
matter of law.6 1 Since all five policy objections to bystander recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress were overcome and the
plaintiff's mental distress was foreseeable, the Sinn court held that Mrs.
Sinn had pleaded facts upon which relief could be granted.
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Eagen agreed that recovery
would be appropriate if:
[T]he plaintiff is closely related to the injured party, such as a
mother, father, husband or wife; the plaintiff is near the scene of and
views the accident; the plaintiff suffers serious mental distress as a
result of viewing the accident ...and there is a severe physical
manifestation of this mental distress.
62
Thus, the concurring justice differed from the majority in that he would
retain the requirement that a plaintiff manifest a severe physical injury
as a result of the mental distress. Mrs. Sinn pleaded that she suffered
from nervous shock,63 which is generally considered a physical injury.64
57. Id at 730-31, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74, 441 P.2d at 914.
58. Id at 731, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74, 441 P.2d at 914.
59. Id at 740-41, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80, 441 P.2d at 920.
60. 404 A.2d at 684-5.
61. Id at 686.
62. Id at 687 (Eagen, C.J., concurring).
63. The fourth count of the complaint averred that: "As a result of watching the aforemen-
tioned accident, the Plaintiff suffered a shock to her nerves and nervous system, and sustained
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Therefore, Chief Justice Eagen held that justice mandated that Mrs.
Sinn be given the opportunity of proving the aforementioned require-
ments.6
5
The dissenting opinion 66 rejected the majority's holding that a
physical injury resulting from emotional distress is not essential to re-
covery for negligent infliction of emotional distress.67 The dissent rea-
soned that without a physical injury any award of damages would be
too speculative.68 Moreover, to allow recovery for mental distress
alone would undercut the social policy of demanding strong emotional
fortitude from all persons.69 Thus, the dissent would retain the physi-
cal injury requirement in negligent infliction of emotional distress
cases.
The dissent's further attack on the majority's holding was that it
was based on arbitrary distinctions. It was pointed out that a mother
may surely suffer severe emotional distress upon learning of her child's
accidental death even though the mother may not have learned of it
until the accident had long since occurred. 70 However, this mother
could not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. There-
fore, the dissent concluded that any mother whether present or not at
her child's death may suffer severe emotional distress. To allow recov-
ery to the witnessing mother while not to the absent mother was clearly
an arbitrary distinction.
Another concern expressed by the dissent was that any application
of the rules espoused by the majority will result in arbitrary recovery.
The dissent demonstrated this arbitrariness with a worthy example:
Three siblings get off a bus. Two attempt to cross the street. The
third begins to walk away. . . and goes down the block. A moment
later he hears screeching car brakes, screams, and one of his siblings
yelling, "My God, Jim is dead." Does the brother have a foreseeable
injury? Is there any way to judge whether his emotional distress "re-
sulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident," or from
"learning of the accident from others after its occurrence?" How
grievous mental pain and suffering resulting in severe depression and an acute nervous condition."
[d at 674.
64. See, e.g., Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
While the majority acknowledged that Mrs. Sinn had pleaded physical injury, the court held that
a physical injury was not essential to recovery.
65. 404 A.2d at 687 (Eagen, C.J., concurring).
66. The dissent was written by Justice Roberts and joined by Justice O'Brien.
67. 404 A.2d at 688 (Roberts, O'Brien, J.J., dissenting).
68. Id
69. Id
70. Id at 691.
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many steps down the street distinguish immediate observation from
indirect learning?7 '
The dissent asserted that any answer to the above questions would lead
to arbitrary recovery. The dissent further asserted that it would be im-
possible to distinguish immediate observation from indirect learning.
Additionally, the dissent reasoned that the emotional distress exper-
ienced by one three blocks from the accident is likely to be as equally
traumatic as one two or four blocks away from the accident. Moreover,
the dissent contended the majority, by using its test, may allow recov-
ery to the closest plaintiff while denying recovery to the other plaintiffs
even though the mental distress may have been equally severe. Thus,
the dissent accused the majority of developing a clearly arbitrary stan-
dard for recovery in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases
which is incapable of uniform application.
As an alternative to the majority's holding in Sinn, the dissent be-
lieved that the "zone of danger" test 72 should be retained. Thus, there
would be no recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress un-
less the tortfeasor had breached a duty directly owed to the plaintiff,
causing the plaintiff to fear for his own physical safety.73 The dissent
reasoned that, by limiting recovery to the class of plaintiffs within the
zone of danger, the arbitrary distinctions set forth in the majority's
opinion would be eliminated.
Finally, the dissent asserted that the majority had circumvented
the legislative intent of Pennsylvania's wrongful death statute.74 This
legislation provides for specific recovery to a mother emotionally in-
jured by a tortfeasor's negligent killing of her child.75 Moreover, it cre-
ated a new76 and independent right for the mother to recover for the
wrong that was done to her.77 The dissent contended that in the pres-
ent case the majority allowed the mother to collect for injury to the
feelings (solatium) which is proscribed by the statute. The dissent fur-
ther asserted that grief caused by the loss of a child must be an integral
part of the plaintiff's mental distress and that injury, by statute, must
71. Id at 692.
72. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
73. 404 A.2d at 688 (Roberts, O'Brien, J.J., dissenting).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8301 (Purdon 1978).
75. The measure of damages for the wrongful death of a minor consists of funeral expenses,
plus the total earnings which would have been earned by the child up to the age of twenty-one,
minus the cost of maintaining the child during this period, with the resulting amount reduced to
its present worth. See, e.g., Swartz v. Smokowitz, 400 Pa. 109, 161 A.2d 330 (1960).
76. This cause of action was unknown to Pennsylvania's common law and was created by
legislation. See Howard v. Bell Tel. Co., 306 Pa. 518, 160 A. 613 (1932).
77. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. 318, 328 (1858).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
go uncompensated. Therefore, the dissent stated that, by allowing re-
covery, the Sinn court had undermined the legislative determination
that compensation for damages suffered by the class of individuals to
which the plaintiff belonged must be obtained through the wrongful
death statute.
ANALYSIS OF SINN V. BURD
The depth and inconsolable nature of a parent's loss at the death
of a child must be among the most traumatic in human experience.
Where that death is caused by another's irresponsible act, it is under-
standable that parents should turn to the law to seek redress for the
harm done to them. Yet, as Dean Prosser noted, even the law is not
capable of righting every wrong, nor compensating every injury.
78
Moreover, fundamental jurisprudential wisdom demands that recovery
not be based on arbitrary rules and distinctions. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Sinn has allowed recovery based on
arbitrary rules and distinctions.
Arbitrariness
While the dissent has given a vivid example 79 of how the major-
ity's standard is arbitrary, an examination of other jurisdictions which
allow bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress
will more clearly demonstrate the arbitrary nature of the majority's
holding.
California was the first state to allow bystander recovery for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress in Dillon v. Legg.80 In a subsequent
California case, Archibald v. Braverman,"' a mother arriving on the
scene of the accident shortly after her son was negligently injured was
allowed to recover. Her arrival one minute after the accident was con-
sidered to be "contemporaneous" as stated within the second factor of
the test enunciated in Dillon and adopted by the Sinn court. In a more
recent California case, Powers v. Sissoev,82 a mother arrived upon the
scene of her child's accident about thirty minutes after it occurred. Al-
though the mother viewed her injured daughter at the scene of the acci-
dent, she was denied recovery because her arrival was not considered
"contemporaneous." Logically, the emotional distress suffered by a
78. PROSSER, supra note 2, § I at 2-4.
79. See text accompanying notes 70 and 72 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
81. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
82. 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974).
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mother upon viewing her injured child thirty minutes after an accident
is just as severe as if she had viewed the child one minute after the
accident had occurred. Clearly, the Sinn court's requirement of "con-
temporaneousness" will lead to these types of arbitrary distinctions.
A plaintiff may suffer severe emotional distress upon learning
from others of an accident after the accident had occurred. 83 In Kelly v.
Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd ,84 a father died of a heart attack upon be-
ing informed by telephone of the deaths of his daughter and grand-
daughter in an automobile accident. However, his estate was denied
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress as the plaintiff
learned of the accident from others as contrasted with actually observ-
ing the accident.8 5 Therefore, by applying the test adopted in Sinn, a
plaintiff with obviously severe emotional distress will be arbitrarily de-
nied recovery if he learns of the accident from others.
Another example of the arbitrariness resulting from the majority's
holding can be found in the third requirement for recovery. That re-
quirement states that the bystander must have a close relationship with
the injured person.86 In Rhode Island, a mother can recover for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress while a close personal friend can-
not.87 In Arizona, even one who was a close friend of the victim may
recover, 8 while in Hawaii not all closely related persons can recover.
8 9
This variety of rules limiting recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress is eloquent testimony that there is no uniform non-arbi-
trary definition of who is closely related.
83. In fact, some experts are of the opinion that the emotional distress may actually be worse
when a person does not observe the circumstances in which a loved one died or was injured. This
is because a person could very well imagine a scene much more gruesome and horrible than
actually happened. Leibson, Recovery of Damagesfor Emotional Distress Caused by Physical In-
jury to Another, 15 J. FAMILY L. 163, 196 n.79 (1976-77).
84. 56 Haw. 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975).
85. Id at 208, 532 P.2d at 675-76.
86. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
87. D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975). The plaintiffs in D'Ambra
sued to recover for physical and emotional injuries incurred by witnessing their four year old son
being struck and killed by a United States mail truck. The court in allowing recovery attempted
to limit the scope of liability. It did so by limiting recovery in future such cases to plaintiffs who
are closely related to the victim.
88. Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979). The plaintiff in Keck brought suit to
recover for the emotional distress she suffered as a result of witnessing her mother die in an auto-
mobile accident. The court held that to recover the plaintiff must have had a close personal rela-
tionship to the victim either by consanguinity or otherwise. Id. at 117, 593 P.2d at 670.
89. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). The plaintiff, a ten year old boy,
was allowed to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress when he witnessed his step-
grandmother's accidental death. The court in Leong held that due to Hawaiian customs, a step-
grandmother was a close enough relationship to warrant liability. The court suggested that a
blood relationship may not necessarily be close enough to warrant recovery and that future plain-
tiffs must prove the nature of their relationship with the victim. Id at 411, 520 P.2d at 766.
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Even Dean Prosser, a firm supporter of recovery in negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress cases, admitted that arbitrariness cannot
be avoided. He limited recovery to include only the immediate family
and only if they additionally manifested a physical injury. 90 However,
Prosser's expostulation created as many questions as it answered. If a
foster child or a very close cousin living in the home is the victim, is
either considered immediate family? Surely Prosser's suggestions
would not negate the inherent arbitrariness of allowing some to recover
for negligent infliction of emotional distress while others with equally
severe emotional distress must go without compensation.
Circumvention of the Wrongful Death Statute
Furthermore, it does appear that the holding in Sinn will have the
effect of circumventing the legislative intent of Pennsylvania's wrongful
death statute.91 The legislature has realized that a parent suffers a great
loss when his or her child is negligently killed. This statute has been
interpreted as giving the parents their own cause of action to compen-
sate them for the loss they have suffered.92 Damages are limited to
funeral expenses, plus the total earnings which would have been earned
by the child up to the age of twenty-one, minus the cost of maintaining
the child during that period, with the amount reduced to the present
value.93 Nothing is recoverable for the mental suffering of the surviv-
ing parents. The legislature has adjudged those damages as being too
speculative to reasonably estimate.94 The majority in Sinn claims that
it is not giving damages for the mental suffering of losing a child but
rather for the shock of witnessing the death of a child.95 However, even
if it is assumed, arguendo, that medical science is able to prove emo-
tional distress absent a physical manifestation of the distress, 96 logic
90. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 54 at 334.
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8301 (Purdon 1978).
92. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. 318, 329 (1858).
93. See note 75 supra. See also Smith v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 173 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.
1949); Palmer v. Moren, 44 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Pa. 1942); Schultheir v. Levin, 372 Pa. 513, 94
A.2d 740 (1953); Allen v. Silverman, 355 Pa. 471, 50 A.2d 275 (1947).
94. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. 318, 328 (1858).
95. 404 A.2d at 675 n.3.
96. It cannot be assumed that medical science is accurately able to prove psychic injuries
alone. As one commentator noted:
Regardless of the different theories and systems used in the training of psychiatrists, it
can be proved that such training, regardless of the psychiatric system taught, is specula-
tive and subjective in content as practiced today, and is not founded upon scientific prin-
ciples. Psychiatry has been developed and is taught from combinations of argumentative
and speculative theories born from personal experiences and ideas which are presented
as facts without classification or validation. There are just too many contradictions and
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dictates that it is impossible for medical science to separate the mental
anguish caused by witnessing the death of a child and the subsequent
or contemporaneous realization by the parent that the child is lost to
the parent forever. Therefore, by allowing a parent to recover more
damages than those permitted in the statute, the Sinn court has circum-
vented the legislative intent of the Pennsylvania wrongful death statute.
An alternative to the "pure negligence" test adopted in Sinn is the
"zone of danger" test.97 Simplified, the "zone of danger" test states that
there is a duty to use reasonable care to avoid causing another the fear
of physical injury, the breach of which will lead to the actor's being
liable for all the damages he proximately caused. The zone of danger
itself is not arbitrary since it is defined as the area in which a reason-
able man would fear for his own physical safety. 98 Thus, when apply-
ing the "zone of danger" test, only the class of plaintiffs who are within
the zone of personal physical danger could recover. The arbitrary dis-
tinctions resulting from the standards adopted in Sinn, such as contem-
poraneousness and close relationships, would be eliminated as such
distinctions would be irrelevant to recovery in negligent infliction of
emotional distress cases. Therefore, the "zone of danger" test is not
arbitrary and should have been retained in Sinn.
Moreover, retention of the "zone of danger" test in Sinn would not
have circumvented the legislative intent of Pennsylvania's wrongful
death statute. 99 The fact that someone died during the accident would
not preclude a plaintiff from recovery as long as he was within the
"zone of danger," because the action would result from someone
breaching a duty owed to the plaintiff, not a duty owed toward a third
person. Thus, wrongful death statutes would never enter into negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims since such claims result from a
separate breach of duty. The negligent infliction of emotional distress
disagreements presently existing which seem to be irreconcilable among the leading psy-
chiatrists and systems to justify the acceptance of psychiatry as an established science.
Therefore, since the state of psychiatric diagnosis is presently so fraught with inconsis-
tencies, errors, chance, personality, and intellectual interferences, it has to be concluded
that psychiatrists, and their psychiatric testimony, when properly weighed and tested, are
many times so confusing and contradictory as to be of no constructive help in aiding a
court or jury to reach a right and just decision pertaining to an individual's mental or
emotional state.
McNeal, The Value ofa Psychiatrist, 1972 LEGAL MED. ANN. 303, 307, 313.
97. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
98. See, e.g., Welsh v. Davis, 307 F. Supp. 416 (D. Mont. 1969); Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F.
Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1965); Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965).
99. It must be noted that if Mrs. Sinn's daughter had not died but had only been seriously
injured, the circumvention of the wrongful death statute would not be an issue.
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claim would not be the result of watching someone else die, but rather
from fearing for one's own physical safety. Had the "zone of danger"
test been retained in Sinn,' °° the court would not have circumvented
the legislative intent of Pennsylvania's wrongful death statute.
Potentially Unduly Burdensome Liability
Another strong argument against allowing bystander recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress is that it will create unduly
burdensome liability, a public policy issue that is unrelated to the tradi-
tional tort concepts of negligence--duty, breach, proximate cause, and
damages.' 0' The court in Sinn agreed that it was extending the scope
of liability. However, the Sinn court reasoned that this extension was
not unduly burdensome nor would it have dire effects on insurance
costs. 0 2 Other courts have disagreed.
In Waube v. Warrington,0 3 a mother died shortly after she suf-
fered emotional shock as a result of witnessing the defendant's negli-
gent killing of her child in an automobile accident. Her estate was
denied recovery. The Waube court held that the allowing of recovery
would result in liability wholly out of proportion to the culpability of
the negligent tortfeasor and would also unduly burden the users of the
highways. 104
In the more recent case of Tobin v. Grossman,105 the New York
Court of Appeals accepted the assertion that the possibility of fraudu-
lent claims was not a valid reason for denying recovery in negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims. The court also accepted the ar-
gument that causation could be proven by medical science. Neverthe-
less, the Tobin court denied the mother recovery since it would be
creating unduly burdensome liability and the area of liability was inca-
pable of rational circumscription. 0 6 The Tobin court was further con-
cerned with the effect on insurance costs if recovery was allowed.
10 7
The Tobin court noted that constantly advancing insurance costs can
become unduly burdensome and that the aggregate recoveries in a sin-
100. Since Mrs. Sinn was clearly outside the zone of danger, she would have been precluded
from recovering if the "zone of danger" test had been retained.
101. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); Colla v. Mandella,
I Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
102. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
103. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
104. Id at 607, 258 N.W. at 501.
105. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969).
106. Id at 618-19, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560-62, 249 N.E.2d at 423-24.
107. [d at 617, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559-60, 249 N.E.2d at 423.
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gle accident of this kind are not likely to stay within compulsory or
even ordinary insurance liability coverage.
10 8
Although the Sinn court stated that it found no evidence that al-
lowing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress would
have dire effect on insurance cost and that this "dollars-and-cents" ar-
gument was unpersuasive, 0 9 there is substantial evidence suggesting
that automobile insurance costs are becoming an undue burden on mo-
torists. Automobile insurance costs have been advancing at a rapid
rate. 0 The burden of these increases can be demonstrated by the fact
that at the end of 1977, nationally, there were over fifteen million
automobiles which were uninsured,"' many because the owners could
not afford automobile insurance. 112 Moreover, the effect of extending
liability in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims will further
burden motorists, in the form of higher insurance premiums, as insur-
ance companies will have a greater exposure of risk and an additional
type of claim to defend.' 13 Thus, it is clear that the Sinn court treated
the public policy issue of unduly burdensome liability lightly, whereas
if the court had examined fully this social problem, it may have de-
cided that society could not afford to compensate Mrs. Sinn's emotional
distress.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs, throughout time, have argued that defendants who cause
them emotional distress must be held liable. However, most courts
have limited recovery to cases where the defendant has caused the
plaintiff to fear for his or her own personal physical safety. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Sinn has expanded this venerable
doctrine to include plaintiffs whose physical well-being has not been
placed in jeopardy. By so doing, the Sinn court has clearly established
arbitrary rules and distinctions which are incapable of uniform and fair
application. Furthermore, by allowing the plaintiff in Sinn to recover
what must surely include solatium, the Sinn court has circumvented the
108. Id
109. 404 A.2d at 684.
110. From 1967 through 1979, the cost of the average automobile insurance policy rose 128.7
percent while the cost of living rose only 117.4 percent. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
FACT SHEET (1980).
111. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, INSURANCE FACTS 31 (1979).
112. Interview with Ralph Weiner, former president of the Illinois Independent Insurance
Brokers Association, in Chicago, Illinois (Feb. 29, 1980).
113. Id Mr. Weiner notes that these types of suits are often very expensive to defend as they
involve many psychiatric examinations and much expert testimony.
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legislative intent of Pennsylvania's wrongful death statute. Moreover,
the Sinn court did not forcefully address the public policy issue of un-
duly burdensome liability.
In view of the facts in Sinn, the holding is not altogether surpris-
ing. However, decisions are not made in a vacuum. Since this decision
must lead in the future to arbitrary results, it frustrates a basic purpose
and policy of tort law; namely, to achieve consistently just results in the
resolution of private disputes. It certainly can be maintained that over
the passage of time the holding in Sinn will lead to more injustice than
would allowing recovery only to those who reasonably fear for their
physical safety.
MARK J. Liss

